From the BBC
Fresh fighting has erupted in the southern Iraqi city of Basra and elsewhere, as Iraqi security forces battle Shia militants for a second day.
Like, seriously, what the hell is going on in Iraq? I can never tell if this violence is beyond the bush II regime's control (a chaotic, bloody mess makes them look bad) or part of some Machiavellian plan to keep the country weak and divided (manipulate the groups into fighting each other), so far, I've been thinking it was the former; what with the shit-kicking the Repugs take domestically for this fiasco, and for the failure to get their oil-giveaway bill passed through the Iraqi Parliament.
This explosion of violence between the government and the Shia majority would appear to be a disaster for the occupation, since the Shiites control most of the country, including the lifeline to Baghdad from Basra on the coast.
But, from the article:
Sadrists are convinced the operation is an attempt to weaken them ahead of provincial elections due in October, but Mr Maliki has embarked on a risky strategy, says the BBC's Roger Hardy.It appears that Sadr is being goaded into a confrontation. Which is insane, but it might also mean that this is some deliberate effort of the bush II regime to foment violence, regardless of that undermining the propaganda about the success of the "surge."
For one thing, it is far from clear that it will succeed.
The Sadrist movement enjoys widespread support, especially among the young and the poor, and is well entrenched in Basra and many other predominantly Shia towns and cities in the south.
For another, if the ceasefire which the Sadrists have largely followed since last year were to collapse, that would seriously undermine claims by the government - and by the Bush administration in Washington - that Iraq was moving from civil war to political reconciliation, our correspondent says.
I can't figure it out. Unless they're simply totally insane.
4 comments:
It's like this:
1) The Americans invaded Iraq operating under certain breezy assumptions about what would happen after they knocked off the Hussein regime. They didn't bring enough troops, so things got messy afterwards. Mistakes were made, like the disbanding of the military and the gutting of the civil service.
2) An insurgency consisting of former regime elements, Iranian-sponsored proxies, Shiite and Sunni militias, garden-variety nationalists, and jihadist types quickly sprang up. This was not an insurgency in the classic (ie. Maoist) sense as there was no political unity between the groups. It was instead a networked insurgency with no central leadership cadre. In other words, so long as some kind of central authority existed it could never expect to take political power; fomenting chaos is another matter entirely, though.
3) In the first three or so years of the war, the Americans did their usual thing: they attempted to arrange large-scale engagements in which their advantages of firepower and force concentration could be brought to bear. Securing cleared areas, ie. the French oil-spot counterinsurgency strategy, was not something they prioritized. This led to predictable combat operations followed by equally predictable slidebacks afterwards. They only began to figure out that small-unit actions and force dispersion amongst the local population would result in the achievement of their operational objectives, ie. the creation of a unitary state in Iraq (one that possesses the legitimized use of force, in other words).
4) A central government was created through a locally-approved constitutional process and elections were held, but political infighting limited its authority and the lack of credible federal-level security forces made things worse. This problem has largely been resolved in the past three or so years, with 150k Iraqi army personnel coming on-stream and a much larger number of police trained. Fortunately, the constitution suggested massive decentralization of power, so the yanks could proceed province-by-province with their security effort and bypass the fed.
5) American combat operations were focused on Al-Qaeda &c, who have been responsible for most of the real mayhem taking place in the country; by "real mayhem" I mean mass-casualty attacks on civilians. AQ was originally supported by the Sunnis, who feared Shiite domination and don't much like Shiism in the first place. The problem with the AQ boys is that they tend to murder everyone who disagrees with them, so they eventually wore out their welcome. CLC groups in Sunni areas began battling it out with AQ; nationalist groups like the 1920 Brigades did the same; and eventually these former insurgents were brought into the fringes of the security services. They will eventually be incorporated into the national force.
6) While AQ was gleefully murdering everyone and attempting to incite sectarian civil war, much Shia-Sunni score settling was taking place under the aegis of various insurgent militia groups. Many of them were formed in response to local security problems -- the central government could not protect individual communities -- and many thought that the surest defense was a good offense, ie. murdering the sectarian opposition and driving them out of the neighborhood. This was the phase in which things were really spiralling out of control, as no one trusted the government, the Shia were in bed with various Iranian-allied militias and were murdering Sunnis, the Sunnis were in bed with various nationalist and AQ-backed movements and were murdering Shia, the security services were completely unreliable, the army was a joke, and the central government was preoccupied with petty politics. The only area in which things were ok was the Kurdish north, because everyone hates the Kurds, the Kurds hate everyone else, and they were able to erect a legitimate regional government fairly quickly. Of course they started prodding the Turks almost immediately, but that's another matter.
7) The Americans rebooted their strategy, replaced their general with a counterinsurgency expert (he's got a Ph.D, too), and brought in enough personnel to start clear-and-hold operations. At the same time the Sunni locals began turning against AQ and the most bloodthirsty of the insurgents, which deprived our guerillas of their sea of the people and most of their logistical support. Indigenous Iraqi forces began coming on-line, sectarian violence declined, and the most violent part of the insurgency was essentially broken. The Sunnis figured out that they weren't going to be able to intimidate a Shia-dominated government and came to the table in an attempt to preserve what remained of their position. Responsibility for security was flipped over to most provinces, and American troops now play an advisory and support role; this is demonstrably true in terms of today's operations, in which the Army and Police are operating without assistance from coalition ground forces.
8) But your question is why they're going up against Al-Sadr, and it's time to address that. Sadr runs the biggest and most belligerent militia group in the country, he's backed by the Iranians, and he has visions of overthrowing the government and replacing it with a Shia fundamentalism modeled on the one that currently exists in Tehran, where he currently resides. He's got weapons and armed men, and the areas in which they operate are out of the range of the force projection of the government. If there is to be a unified Iraqi government, militias must be disbanded and folded into the security forces of the state; until this happens, warlordism and gangsterism will prevail. Now that the army is in a position to conduct its own offensive operations and the police are proficient enough to clear what the army takes in kinetic combat, the central government can finally act against the Shia militias -- and Sadr's movement is at the top of the list of those that are slated for destruction. This is a deliberate effort of the Maliki regime to entrench its position and reach out to Sunnis, who don't like the fact that armed Shias at the south are roving around with guns. Ever since the Sunni component of the insurgency started to get kicked around it was obvious to all observers that the other uncontrolled, trouble-making armed groups would be next. And this, my good man, is what's happening. It's classic state-formation and rather shrewd. Sadr is in Iran, so he can't charismatically direct his movement from the front; this means it can be fragmented and peeled away. You need to get your news from somewhere other than Znet (jes kidding) :)
http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2008/03/how-far-against-sadr.html
Actually, pretty much all of what you wrote I've gotten in some way, shape, or form, from Znet, CounterPunch, CommonDreams, and all the usual suspects.
I would hesitate to call this bloody fiasco "classic state-formation." Re-learning the politics of Saddam Hussein's Iraq is more like it.
This move against Sadr though, ... your mentioning of Sadr's close Iranian ties makes me think that it's the first stage in an attack on Iran. Attempting to neutralize Iran's most powerful Iraqi ally, the guy who could do the most damage to US forces to punish them for any attack on Iran.
It still seems crazy. Maliki's government is unpopular and appears irrelevant to many Iraqis. Sadr has a strong domestic following, that might get bigger before it gets destroyed. And that's if it gets destroyed. The Sunni insurgency managed to fight for almost four years without the same following as Sadr has.
Iran doesn't really need to be attacked. The US took positions in Iraq and Afghanistan to make them feel the pressure. The major priority right now is to inhibit their interference in Iraqi domestic affairs, which has been running at titanic heights of meddling since 2004. If they continue to seek weapons they will probably take a regime-changing knock on the head a-la-NATO vs. Serbia in the late 1990s, but beating down Sadr presages nothing: I understand you might find this objectionable, but the United States doesn't actually control the Iraqi government, and this score-settling is directly in the Iraqi government's best interest for a number of reasons, foremost amongst which is that one can't aspire to government while there are uncontrollable armed men roving around. The Sadrists have some support in some areas but aren't really in the Ali Sistani good books and have suffered from both combat losses and the exile of their leader. M is going to lose this one very badly indeed, and it's about bloody time. After he gets knocked about sufficiently it'll be time for new elections, which will finally bring the Sunnis into the political side of government. I'm looking forward to it, personally, as I'd earnestly like Iraq to become the Middle East's first non-Israeli democracy. If it can happen there in spite of ethnic antagonism and civil war, it can happen in all of the other illiberal rights-violating excuses-for-states in the region.
Iran doesn't really need to be attacked.
Neither, for that matter, did Iraq. Saddam Hussein knew which country in the world was the global superpower, and he would have cut any deal with the USA to get back in their good books.
Unfortunately for him, he was in their black books because of the US government's tendency to self-reinforcing delusions.
But for the record; Saddam thought he was America's new "cop on the beat" after the fall of the Shah, and he thought he had the Bush Sr. administration's permission to teach Kuwait a lesson before he invaded.
Furthermore, there was no plot to kill Bush Sr.
Furthermore, Saddam was complying to a great degree with the entire inspections process.
So, certainly, Iran doesn't "need" to be attacked. As if that counts for anything.
The US took positions in Iraq and Afghanistan to make them feel the pressure.
They've surrounded them. Which might simply mean "pressure" or it might mean launching pads for air assaults.
The major priority right now is to inhibit their interference in Iraqi domestic affairs, which has been running at titanic heights of meddling since 2004.
While I'm well aware of the maxim: "The strong do what they will and the weak accept what they must," I do find it laughable that you feel obligated to insert such flourishes as "titanic heights of meddling" when addressing this situation. The titanic heights of hypocrisy required to actually be offended by Iran's "meddling" in Iraq whilst endorsing the US occupation of Iraq are dizzying.
If they continue to seek weapons
You mean an insurance policy against the paranoid, rabid Israelis and the lunatic US gov't?
they will probably take a regime-changing knock on the head a-la-NATO vs. Serbia in the late 1990s,
Another criminal act of US foreign policy. If they comply with their treaty obligations (and the West complies with Iran's treaty rights) then we will be strenghtening a productive example of international law. Allowing scoff-laws like India, Israel, and Pakistan to build and disseminate the knowledge of building nuclear weapons, while attacking Iran for simply pursuing nuclear energy, will send messages that might have "unintended consequences" in international affairs.
but beating down Sadr presages nothing: I understand you might find this objectionable,
You're goddamned right I find it objectionable. 1 million dead [if you have a better criticism of the John Hopkins study than that it's based on extrapolation, I'm prepared to read it. Until then, the 1 million deaths is quite valid, and quite horrible], over 2 million refugees, how many more wounded and maimed.
If the Maliki cabinet can't attempt to find common ground with Sadr, and instead launches an unprovoked attack, after so much Iraqi blood has already been spent, then yes, I find it objectionable.
And I'm pretty sure that I don't like Sadr. He's an intolerant, fundamenatlist zealot. But he was also adhering to a truce, and contributing to an important reduction of violence.
One would have to be inhuman to cheer this on.
but the United States doesn't actually control the Iraqi government,
No, they just provide its "green zone" fortress, arm and train its soldiers, and provide vital air support to it. Maliki doesn't have to be a marionette with no mind of his own in order to be beholden to the US. He violates the rights of the Iraqi parliament routinely in order to deliver for the US gov't.
and this score-settling is directly in the Iraqi government's best interest for a number of reasons, foremost amongst which is that one can't aspire to government while there are uncontrollable armed men roving around.
You are of course aware that the "surge" is based to a great extent on paying other barely controllable armed men roving around, providing security for their own areas and their own people?
That central fact undercuts a central rationalization for this renewed warfare.
The Sadrists have some support in some areas but aren't really in the Ali Sistani good books and have suffered from both combat losses and the exile of their leader. M is going to lose this one very badly indeed, and it's about bloody time.
Me, I can't see myself advocating for such ruthless, cold-blooded calculations to affect the fates of societies outside my own. I think that's wrong.
After he gets knocked about sufficiently it'll be time for new elections, which will finally bring the Sunnis into the political side of government.
Yes. Of course. Because the only thing blocking Sunni participation was Sadr. The only thing blocking Sunni participation in Iraqi politics was their desire to hold out for more than they could get from their minority status. The only thing keeping them quiet now is US dollars. Sadr has nothing to do with this.
I'm looking forward to it, personally, as I'd earnestly like Iraq to become the Middle East's first non-Israeli democracy. If it can happen there in spite of ethnic antagonism and civil war, it can happen in all of the other illiberal rights-violating excuses-for-states in the region.
Oh my fucking god. There it is, the core of insanity beneath all your veneer.
To actually believe that the US intends to bring "democracy" to Iraq, ... intended it all along, ... is the most braindead, shithead argument.
Israel made itself a democracy, and as a democracy, it supports the foreign policy of the United States (and even then, often only when it suits it) because of massive material assistance it receives from the US.
As a people, many Israeli voters appear to want to expand into Arab lands. The US doesn't oppose this, supports this, and therefore, this democracy can work with the US.
Iranian democracy wanted to nationalize the oil industry away from Great Britain. This didn't work for the British, who persuaded the Americans (no fans of LDC nationalization initiatives themselves) to overthrow Iranian democracy, bringing on the "unintended consequences" we see today.
Arab democracy in general will see a call for (now) enhanced religious power and greater Arab control over their own oil. Arab democracy and US self-interests are diametrically opposed.
AS such, US initiatives to bring "democracy" to the area will only be discrediting shams, that will only enflame cynicism and hatred of the United States.
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