Monday, February 5, 2007

A Positive Foreign Policy

Canada, like other tag-alongs in the OECD, has generally followed a pro-Great Power foreign policy. We used to cheer the progress of British imperialism, and for the past sixty years we've enjoyed the results of, and aided and abetted, US imperialism.

As leftists, progressives, anti-imperialists, or whatever, we have found this to be an uncomfortable, distasteful pattern of behaviour. While Canadian foreign policy has been presented by its practitioners as being motivated by idealism, it too often appears to be cynical and sordid.

On the other hand, given the nature of the main adversaries to US imperialism (Soviet totalitarians, Maoist totalitarians, intolerant regimes of rapists and torturers) it's not as if Canada could simply abandon the "bad guys" and jump over to the "good guys" side. As our own country's behaviour demonstrates; there are no good guys.

Then there's also the reality that we share a border with a vain, jealous, self-righteous, unstable super-power. Any especially uncomfortable expressions of independence by a radical Canadian government would surely provoke an organized and sustained campaign of internal destabilization and probable overthrow.

But still, the status-quo cannot remain an option for forward-thinking Canadians. In the interest of defining an honourable and realistic new direction in Canadian foreign policy, I think I'll devote some time that I don't have to evaluating the main schools of thought on international affairs, dismissing them all as useless, and pulling out of the ether the idea that I had at the very beginning, as the way forward.

But first, ... the stuff that they pay me to do ....

The Poverty of "Realism"

Realism in international politics refers to a school of thought wherein government foreign policy leaders are motivated almost entirely by the pursuit of the survival and increased power of the state that they control.

It hearkens back to an era before economics (GDP, literacy, quality of life, etc.,) when politics was about the expansion of territory and the personal aggrandizement of rulers. The sentiments of the 5th century BCE Athenian historian Thucydides in his The Peloponnesian War express the central tenets of realism: "The strong do as they will and the weak endure what they must."

In realism there are no ideologies, no honour, no permanent friends or enemies, just shifting alliances based on a cold, ruthless calculus as to what best suits the current needs of the state.

Realism explains how the Soviet Union could be seen supporting ideologically-opposite autocracies that crushed their own socialist movements; it explains why Mao's China elected to move into the US orbit, and why a staunch anti-communist like Nixon would entice it to do so. Because ideology becomes secondary to the compulsions of government foreign policy leaders to perpetuate and expand the powers of their states.

Realism has a lot of explanatory power, but it falls short in offering any purpose to this activity. The state is not just some monster that takes over the minds of the human beings entrusted with its leadership. Furthermore, those human leaders are not insulated from the pressures of special interests within the nation who might ask for consideration on areas of importance only to themselves. Finally, when some politicians practice "idealist" policies (which I'll get to), realists pronounce them as misguided and deluded, but the very existence of these deluded policies puts the lie to the realist contention that there are no other motivations other than state power.

Finally, realism becomes utterly bankrupt when its theoreticians attempt to practice what they believe. Then you get the worst pseudo-intellectual slop, masquerading as "high politics," ... you get the mess of Afghanistan and the "blow-back" of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and all the rest. By treating everyone shabbily, as only fair-weather friends and all potential enemies, you have a self-fulfilling prophecy of a dangerous, amoral, violent anarchic world. Review the serial blundering of Henry Kissinger for evidence.

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